







BANK OPTIMAL PORTFOLIO RISK LEVEL  






University of Nice Sophia-Antipolis, GREDEG-CNRS 
 
Olivier Bruno 
University of Nice Sophia-Antipolis, GREDEG-CNRS  









  Alexandra Girod et Olivier Bruno 
  2
Bank Optimal Portfolio Risk Level  








Université de Nice Sophia-Antipolis, GREDEG-CNRS  





We investigate the impact the risk sensitive regulatory ratio may have on banks' risk taking 
behaviours according to two aspects: potential effects induced by the implementation of a risk 
sensitivity ratio and cyclical impacts that could affect risk taking behaviour. We show that the 
risk sensitivity of capital requirements introduce by Basel II adds either a regulatory "bonus" 
or "penalty" on a bank that owns a fixed capital endowment. Depending on the magnitude of 
cyclical variations into requirements, the "bonus" may be exploited by the bank to increase its 
value toward the selection of a riskier asset or the "penalty" may restrict the bank to opt for a 
less risky asset. Whether the optimal asset risk level swings among classes of risk through the 
cycle, the risk level of bank's portfolio may increase during economic upturns, or decrease in 
downturns, leading to a rise in financial fragility or a "fly to quality" phenomenon. 
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Banking supervisors face the challenging task to preserve the safety of the financial system 
without hampering the key role banks play in the financing of the economic activity. Among 
the available tools to comply with these objectives, capital requirements receive important 
research attention. In the midst of the questions related to this dilemma, two fields emerge. On 
one hand, the risk taking incentive induced by regulatory requirements and its consequences 
on the safety of the banking system raise concerns. On the other hand, the impact of the 
regulatory ratio on the business cycle concentrates high research consideration. However the 
literature fails to reach a consensus about the effects induced by the regulatory capital to asset 
ratio, especially on risk taking incentives. 
Concerning the impact of the capital to asset ratio on the business cycle, analyses converge 
toward the idea that the capital to asset ratio exacerbates the business cycle, phenomenon 
known as procyclicality (Blum and Hellwing 1995, Furfine 2001). Economic environment 
indeed affects borrowers' risk profile: as business conditions deteriorate, it becomes harder for 
borrowers to honour their debt and defaults may increase during recession periods. Reverse 
happening while economic upturns, where the improvement in economic conditions may lead 
to over optimist expectations on the willingness and the capability of borrowers to honour 
their debt. Nevertheless banks are subject to regulatory capital requirements. As bank capital, 
among other goals, prevents the bank from bankruptcy by absorbing borrowers' defaults, bank 
capital reveals as a more expensive source of funding for banks than deposits. 
When recession occurs, banks may face increased borrowers' defaults that deepen their 
capital. To maintain their compliance with the regulatory capital to asset ratio, banks cut their 
loan supply, reducing the denominator of the regulatory ratio, rather than raising fresh 
expensive capital. This drop in loan supply affects borrowers who depend from banks to 
finance their activity, exacerbating therefore the recession. Conversely, when economic 
conditions improve, banks profits increase allowing banks to expand their loan supply by 
retaining part of the profits as new capital, fostering thus the expansion phase. 
The procyclicality of the regulatory requirements seems to be amplified by a risk sensitive 
regulatory ratio (Kashyap and Stein 2004, Catarineu-Rabell et al. 2004, Heitfeild 2004, Heid 
2007, Pederzolli et al. 2009). As business conditions improve, the regulatory ratio decreases 
to reflect the amelioration of borrowers' risk profiles, allowing an even greater expansion of 
banks' loan supply; whereas, during recession phases, the regulatory requirements increase as 
borrowers' risk profiles worsen, restricting further banks loan supply. Bank internal rating 
system affects borrowers risk assessment, with a point in time (PIT) rating system being more 
sensitive to change into current economic conditions than a through the cycle (TTC) risk 
assessment approach, and involves a higher procyclicality for a PIT operating banks. 
Although how regulatory requirements interact with the business cycle and impact banks' 
lending behaviour seems to reach a consensus, researchers disagree about the magnitude and 
the timing of the phenomenon: how important the procyclical impact would be as how long 
would it last, particularly whether banks are capital constrained or display a capital buffer, 
remain an open debate. 
The literature on that question presents the common feature to analysis the asset side of banks 
portfolio by segregating bonds and loans, and assumes a positive regulatory charge assigned 
to loans and none to bonds. Actually bonds are considered as risk-free investment, leading to 
zero regulatory requirement, and also as a liquid asset that can be easily sold on the market. 
Consequently, as economic conditions worsen, a bank facing borrowers' defaults would prefer 
adjusting its asset portfolio by reducing loans rather than bonds for two main reasons: only 
loans are computed into the regulatory ratio, and, in such recession circumstances, bank runs Alexandra Girod et Olivier Bruno 
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may occur and push bank into insolvency if the bank cannot provide liquidity to depositors. 
On the contrary, when business conditions get better, banks may retain part of earnings as 
capital to increase its loan supply and allocate towards more loans rather than bonds, which 
are more profitable than the risk-free investment. The impact of a risk sensitive regulatory 
ratio is analysed toward the effect the business cycle induces on the requirements level on 
loans imposed to banks, assuming a higher level of regulatory requirements during economic 
downturns than during economic upturns. However, the risk level of the loan selected by the 
bank for its portfolio is over the field of these studies. 
Zhu (2007) extends the analysis of the procyclicality with a comparative static framework where 
value maximizing banks have to choose their lending behaviour but also an endogenous capital 
target, higher than regulatory requirements when they exist, and an internal target of default 
probability, under various regulatory environments (no regulation, risk insensitive regulation and 
risk sensitive requirements). He stresses the offsetting effect of the capital buffer as the active 
portfolio management of banks, with dividend distribution or a rise of new capital at a linear cost, 
to argue that the procyclical effect of a risk sensitive ratio may be of lesser magnitude than 
expected in other studies. Furthermore, his analysis in term of banks dividend policy allows taking 
account of the next period bank capital level. He concludes to the superiority of the risk sensitive 
requirements from a supervisor's welfare point of view. Actually, risk sensitive capital 
requirements avoid distortions into the pricing of loans: as they reflect better the quality of loans, 
rewarding "the high return, low risk investment opportunities" as the diversification effect, "the 
volatility is inversely related to the size of bank assets",
1 the more accurate requirements allow for 
a fair pricing of loans (efficiency aspect on the banking industry).
 This decreases the regulatory 
requirements the bank faces in the current as in the next period, increasing the value of future 
asset earning, its franchise value, encouraging thus the bank to act prudently to preserve its future 
asset earnings (safety aspect). 
Although the analysis conducted by Zhu (2007) focuses on the procyclical impact of 
regulatory requirements, but, with an asset side of banks portfolio whose composition is fixed 
and non adjustable, and with particular asset returns features, he builds bridges toward the 
lending behaviour in term of volume along the business cycle and the risk taking behaviour of 
bank from period to period. 
Concerning the risk taking incentives that can emerge from the implementation of the capital 
regulation, the results provided by the literature are antagonist. Some conclude to an increase 
in the risk level of bank portfolio, others obtain the inverse result, i.e. a reduction of the risk 
level of bank portfolio. 
Several views intersect. In a mean-variance framework, the enforcement of a regulatory 
capital to asset ratio that constrains banks reduces banks' equity value. This drop into the 
value of equity encourages banks to reorganize their asset portfolio toward riskier investments 
in order to improve their profitability and the value of bank equity capital (Koehn and 
Santomero 1980, Kim and Santomero 1988). Taking account of the put option related to the 
safety net of the deposit insurance may change this result (Keeley and Furlong 1991) but the 
value maximizing objective of bank shareholders involves the selection of the riskiest asset 
for which the put option as the bank equity values are maximum (Merton 1977). Conversely, 
whether the bank portfolio is initially well diversified, implementing a binding regulatory 
ratio reduces the risk level of the whole portfolio (Rochet 1992).
2  
                                                 
1. Zhu 2007 page 4 and assumption 2 page 5. 
2. Further studies focus on the adverse selection (Thakor 1996) as the monitoring efforts (Besanko and Kanatas 
(1996) Morrison and White 2005) the bank applies to its borrowers, with diverging conclusions, we do not 
present to alleviate the presentation.  Bank Optimal Portfolio Risk Level Under Various Regulatory Requirements 
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To go further the static analysis, the recognition of the future earnings that constitute the 
franchise value leads to the intuition that a bank which displays a franchise value would act to 
preserve it and opt for a low risk investment strategy (Marcus 1984, Demsetz and al. 1996). 
However, a reduction in this franchise value, due to an increase in banking competition or to 
the implementation of tight regulatory requirements, may induce banks to opt for a riskier 
investment strategy (Blum 1999, Hellman and al 2000). 
Such diverging results may be explained by the setting of each model, depending on a utility 
or value maximizing bank among other assumptions. Actually, Laeven and Levine (2008) 
provide a framework that accounts for the ownership structure of the bank capital and 
conducted an empirical investigation of their model. They find supports that the ownership 
structure (shareholders / manager) implies different reactions in term of risk taking behaviour 
for the same regulation: "the relation between regulation and bank risk can actually change 
sign depending on ownership structure". They also conclude that shareholders' dominated 
structures display a higher propensity to take risk: "bank risk is generally higher in banks that 
have large owners with substantial cash-flow rights (...) although more cash-flow rights by a 
large owner are generally associated with greater bank risk, the importance of the large 
owner is weaker in economies with stronger shareholder protection laws".
3 
Refining the dynamic analysis with a more complex setting and an endogenous bank capital 
target, higher than regulatory requirements, Milne and Whalley (2001) conclude that risk taking 
incentives depend on the level of capital buffer and regulatory requirements have no long run 
effect on bank risk taking. Although they do not explicitly model the asset side of the bank 
portfolio, in particular the distribution of asset returns that embody the future earning and hence 
the franchise value, they stress the critical role played by the franchise value in bank lending 
decisions. Banks displaying a franchise value would act to preserve it, selecting a prudent lending 
behaviour with a low volatility in asset earnings, whereas banks with low or without franchise 
value would gamble and take excessive risk, selecting a high volatility in asset earnings. 
However, it is notable that in their model, the bank capital target is higher for bank with low 
franchise value than for bank with high franchise value: high assets earnings related to an 
important level of franchise value provide a protection against future loose and prevent from the 
infringement of the regulatory requirements; low franchise value banks that want to preserve it 
would consequently choose a higher capital target to overcome the low earning protection. 
Nevertheless, one can wish more detail on the distribution of asset earnings, particularly on the 
volatility of such high asset earnings, to better estimate the impact on bank probability of failure, 
given the lower level of capital target for high franchise value than for low franchise value banks. 
Milne and Whalley (2001) converges toward some of the intuition of Zhu (2007) concerning the 
capital buffer and the incidence the franchise value might have on the risk taking behaviour of 
banks from period to period, although the relationship between the level of franchise value and 
the desired level of capital target is non linear in their model. However, none of them explicitly 
model the asset side of bank portfolio and the relevant risk level of asset retained. 
Moreover, the analysis conducted by Milne and Whalley (2001) shares, with others studies 
devoted to the risk taking behaviour, the feature to examine regulatory requirements in terms of 
level. These studies compare for several levels of capital requirements the reaction the bank might 
have regarding the risk level of the asset selected, at different degrees of formalization for the 
choice of the asset risk level. These comparative statics are also used to study the impact on risk 
taking behaviour of a risk sensitive regulation compare to a risk insensitive capital requirement. 
In this paper, we follow this line of research and aim to study the impact on risk taking behaviour 
the regulatory requirements may have, especially the modifications in risk taking behaviour 
induced by the implementation of a risk sensitive ratio (Basel II) compare to a flat rate requirement 
                                                 
3. Laeven and Levine 2008 pages 5 and 6.  Alexandra Girod et Olivier Bruno 
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(Basel I). We also extend the analysis of business cyclicality on bank risk taking behaviour under 
the risk sensitive requirements to examine whether the revised regulation performs better, compare 
to the precedent, in fulfilling the two objectives of the banking supervision: not hampering bank 
lending role in the economic growth without weakening banking system safety. 
We differ however from other studies presented in this introduction mainly by our assumption of 
invariant capital level, and an asset side of bank portfolio explicitly related to the risk level of the 
asset. We want to focus exclusively on the impact the regulatory ratio may have on bank risk 
taking behaviour, supporting this assumption of constant and non adjustable capital level. 
Furthermore, to concentrate the analysis on the effect of the requirements' risk sensitivity during 
both the transition phase as when the revised regulation is implemented, we exclude risk free 
investment opportunities that lead to none regulatory requirements, and model the asset side of 
bank portfolio with an amount set at one but with different asset risk profiles, involving different 
regulatory requirements for each asset risk level. To highlight the propensity to risk taking 
behaviour, we voluntary set a framework of bank with an ownership structure dominated by 
shareholders. In this line, we decide to opt for a distribution of asset returns that stresses the 
diverging objectives of banks (with an objective of maximizing their profitability) and supervisors 
(displaying the objectives of sound and efficient banking system) and we thus retain the famous 
"higher-risk, higher-returns" assets. Finally, our framework assumes that banks determines their 
own target of default probability, which is also assumed to be constant, but we model neither the 
choice of this internal target of default probability nor the choice of the capital endowment of the 
bank, we take them as given and source of heterogeneity among banks. 
Although our setting exacerbates the risk taking incentives, it allows for the emergence of 
interesting results about the impact the risk sensitivity of the regulatory ratio may have on 
bank risk taking behaviour, results that cannot be excluded under less restrictive assumptions. 
First, the level of available capital that excess over the regulatory requirements and the initial 
composition of bank loan portfolio in terms of asset risk level are crucial to determine the risk 
taking behaviour of banks, while the shift of regulation as when the revised framework is 
implemented. Depending on the composition of bank loan portfolio and the level of capital 
buffer at the time of the switch in regulation, risk sensitive requirements can lead to a 
restriction or a boost in bank risk taking behaviour, as it can leave the asset risk level 
unchanged. Second, the cyclical impact of risk sensitive regulatory requirements in terms of 
asset risk level can be procyclical. On the one hand, riskier asset may be selected by the bank 
as business conditions improve leading to financial fragility of the banking system. On the 
other hand, lesser risky asset may be selected by the bank when economic conditions 
deteriorate leading to a "fly to quality" phenomenon. 
The intuition behind these two results stands on the interaction of the regulatory risk 
sensitivity with the bank value maximizing objective under a panel of "higher-risk higher-
returns" assets. In fine, bank lending decisions depends on the features of bank, its own target 
of default probability and its capital endowment, and bank selects the asset that fulfils its 
objective of value maximizing as complying with its own default probability target. 
According to its characteristics, bank opts for a particular asset risk level, which leads under 
the flat ratio to an 8 % uniform regulatory requirement. As regulation changes and becomes 
risk sensitive, the risk level of the asset chosen by the bank may alter regulatory requirements, 
leading to an increase or a decrease into regulatory charges, as it can leave the capital 
requirements unchanged. With the same reasoning, regulatory capital requirements vary along 
the business cycle, softening as economic environment improves and freeing regulatory 
capital, a "regulatory bonus" rewarding prudent investments as good economic states; reverse 
happening during recession period where regulatory requirements increase, a "regulatory 
penalty" that penalises risky investments as bad economic states. Bank Optimal Portfolio Risk Level Under Various Regulatory Requirements 
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What can be the reaction of a value maximizing bank which faces a "regulatory bonus"? 
Literature on both research fields presented above supports the idea the bank would use this 
bonus to expand its loan supply. We believe this bonus can either be used to increase bank 
value, toward the financing of a riskier asset that increases the bank value. Conversely, the 
"regulatory penalty" restricts the opportunity of investing into a high risk level asset. 
Depending on the capital buffer level, such penalty may force the bank to reduce its risk 
exposure to comply with its internal target of default probability, leading to the selection of a 
less risky asset. If the capital endowment is high enough to absorb the regulatory 
requirements increase and still complying with the bank own target of default probability, the 
bank can keep its loans portfolio unchanged. 
We stress the fact that in each of these scenarios, bank complies with its internal target of 
default probability that remains constant. However, the risk level of bank's portfolio is altered 
along the business cycle into its loans composition and might increase during economic 
upturns, leading to a fragility of the bank and the banking system as a whole. 
The rest of the paper presents the model and the solution to the optimization program of the 
bank with numerical simulations to illustrate the results of the transition phase into the 
regulation. The cyclical aspects are then studied and discussed. 
 
2. The model 
Our contribution is built on Heid (2007). We study the impact of the risk sensitivity of 
regulatory requirements on the choice of asset's risk level made by a bank. We also appraise 
the risk level of assets by the means of the asymptotic single risk factor (hereafter ASRF) 
model used into the regulatory requirements and consequently we make the usual 
assumptions, presented under a formulation closed to Repullo and Suarez (2004). 
2.1. Investment projects 
Consider a two periods economy with a single systematic risk factor  () 0,1 zN ∼  and a 
continuum of firms, indexed by i. Each firm can undertake a risky investment project, requiring 
one unit of wealth at period 0, and we link the firm i to its investment. Moreover, we consider 
that each investment project is related to a specific class of risk. We assume firms lack capital 
and need to borrow from a bank to undertake their project. At period 1, the investment 
generates a gross return equal to () 1 i R +  in case of project success, or () 1 λ −  in case of 
project failure. Project success depends on the value of a random variable  i x  defined by: 
  (1 ) ii i xz μρ ρ ε =+ + −  (1) 
Where the idiosyncratic risk  () 0,1 i N ε ∼  is independently distributed across firms and 
independent of the systematic risk factor z .
4 We assume  i μ  is an increasing function of the 
specific risk of the project i while the correlation coefficient ρ reflects the sensitivity of the 
project to the systematic risk factor. Project i is successful only if  0 i x ≤ , thus  i x  expresses 
the whole level of credit risk appraised by the ASRF model. 
From (1) we note that the unconditional distribution of  i x  is  ( ) ,1 i N μ , so the unconditional 
probability of default for a firm in class i is equal to: 
  Pr ( (1 ) 0) ( ) ii i i pz μρ ρ ε φ μ =+ + − > =  (2) 
                                                 
4. This is the usual formulation retained by the ASRF model and the IRB approach of Basel II.  Alexandra Girod et Olivier Bruno 
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Where φ  denotes the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random variable. 
The probability of default is an increasing function of the specific risk  i μ  for firm i and we 
assume projects are such that  ]] max 0; i pp ∈  with  max 1 p < . 
From (2) we can also determine the distribution of variable  i x  conditional on the realization 
of the systematic risk factor z . This conditional probability of default or the default rate of 












μρ ρ ε φ
ρ
− ⎛⎞ + ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ =+ + − > = ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ − ⎜ ⎝⎠
 (3) 
The default rate of a project is an increasing function of its own class of risk given by its 
probability of default  i p , but also depends on the realization of the systematic risk factor z .  
Finally, recalling that z  is normally distributed, the cumulative distribution function of the 
default rate is given by 
  () ()








−− ⎛⎞ −− ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ = ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎝⎠
 (4) 
The mean of the default rate distribution is the probability of default related to the class of 
risk of project i, while the variance is determined entirely by the exposure (sensitivity) to the 
systematic risk measured by ρ. 
2.2. The banking system 
To supply loans to firms, banks are funded with deposits D  and equity capital K , and we assume 
that  1 KD += . For simplicity, we make the hypothesis of no banking intermediation costs. 
Bank deposits are insured through a government-funded scheme and we assume deposits receive 
the riskless interest rate δ. Bank capital is provided by shareholders who require an expected rate 
of return (1 ) W + , with W δω =+ and  0 ω > , to capture the scarcity of shareholders' wealth 
as the agency and/or the asymmetric information problems they face. 
Banks are subject to a capital regulation and do not raise equity capital along the economic 
cycle: they operate most of the time with a given level of capital inherited from the previous 
business year, increasing their capital by retaining earnings or issuing new equities when their 
business plan requires. However, for a short to medium horizon of analysis, considering that 
banks operate with a constant capital level is a realistic assumption. As investments returns 
are random and regulatory infringements generate important economic costs,
5 banks make 
sure to operate with a higher level of capital than the regulatory requirements. The difference 
between the effective level of bank capital and the regulatory requirements is known as the 
capital buffer. It is important to note that banks actually choose their optimal investments 
portfolio which in turn determines the level of capital buffer. 
Heid (2007) argues "that regulatory requirements shift the bank’s default point from 0 [the 
solvency constraint] to a.w. [the regulatory constraint]" and models his idea through the 
assumption that "the bank sets itself a target probability of its own default".
6 In the line of 
thinking of Heid, we assume banks are endowed at period 0 with a constant level of capital 
K , which is higher than the regulatory requirements  r k , and we also retain his assumption 
that banks choose their own target of default probability. Moreover, banks must display a 
certain rating to access to the interbank market, constraint that can be materialized through 
                                                 
5. We do not model these costs.  
6. Heid (2007) pp. 3888-3889. Bank Optimal Portfolio Risk Level Under Various Regulatory Requirements 
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this internal target of default probability ()
* 1 B α − . However, it seems to us that the intuition 
behind this internal target of default probability is more easily understood when it is presented 
under the non-defaulted perspective. Thus, 
*
B α  is defined as the probability of non default for 
bank and we use this formulation in the rest of the paper. 
The bank's internal target of default probability requires that capital at period 1, i.e. equity 
endowment () K  and expected net returns ( ) () z π  generated by the investment made by the 
bank, must not be smaller than the regulatory requirements in 
*
B α  case: 
 
* Pr ( ) rB Kz k πα ⎡⎤ +≥ = ⎣⎦  (5) 
However, we model neither the choice of the optimal level of equity capital nor the selection 
of the optimal internal target of default probability. On the contrary, we consider them as 
given and source of heterogeneity among banks.
7 We rather focus on the impact the 
regulatory requirements have on the optimal risk level of the asset financed by the bank, given 
its capital endowment and its own target of default probability. 
At period 0, banks decide to allocate their loans portfolio across various investment projects, 
picking the investment project that maximizes their value with respect to their own internal 
target of default probability. We assume that the rate of return on a loan financed by the bank, 
i R , is an increasing function of its credit risk level, represented hereafter by the class of risk it 
belongs to,  i p , and is measured by a spread over the riskless interest rate, denoted  () 0 i Sp > , 
such that  () ii RS p δ =+ . 
At period 1, shareholders receive the net value of the bank if it is positive (no bankruptcy), 
and zero otherwise (assumption of limited liability). Finally, net expected returns for a bank 
financing a project i, conditional on the realization of the systematic risk factor z  is given by: 
  ( ) (1 ( ))(1 ) ( )(1 ) (1 )(1 ) ii i zp z R p z K πλ δ =− + + −−− + (6) 
The first two terms are the expected payments the bank receives in the event of the success 
(1 ( ))(1 ) ii pz R −+  and, in the case of the failure  () ( 1 ) i pz λ − , of the investment project and 
the third term represents the costs of deposits (1 )(1 ) K δ −+ . As we link project to firm, and 
firm to bank, the net expected profits are also the net expected value of the bank at period 1. 
Using the above notations and simplifying (6) we obtain: 
  () () () ( ) () ( ) 1 ii i zS pp z S p K πδ λ δ =− + + + +  (7) 
The objective of the bank is to maximize its expected present value at period 0, net of 






() ( () )     max  
1







Kz d F p z V
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⎡⎤ +≥ = ⎣⎦
∫  
Or equivalently 
                                                 
7. We refer the lecturer to, among others, Jeitschko and Dong Jeung (2005) for an explicit formulation of the 
optimal risk target chosen by the bank, and to Leland and Bjerre Toft (1996) and Diamond and Rajan (2000) for 







() ( ) () 1 (( ) ) max 
1







KS p p z S p K d F p z V
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⎧⎫ ⎪⎪ ++ ⎪⎪ ≡ ⎨⎬ ⎪⎪ ++ ⎪⎪ ⎩⎭
 is the bankruptcy rate of default, defined as the one for 
which the net value of the bank at period 1 is equal to zero, i.e.  () i pz such that  () 0 z π = . 
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The first term into the brackets represents the net expected return (NER) on the investment, 
() () () () () 1 iii Sp p Sp K δλ δ −+ + + + , whereas the second term is the option value (OV) 
of deposit insurance,  () () ()
1
ˆ ()




Sp pz Sp K d Fpz δλ δ −− + + + + ∫  .  
 
3. Optimal asset's risk level choice and regulatory requirements 
Given the assumption of constant capital endowment, the objective of the bank is to find the 
risky asset ()
*
i p  that maximizes its value subject to its own target of PD ( )
*
B α . Note that the 





π ⎛⎞ ∂ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ∂ ⎝⎠
 critically depends on 
the spreads evolution regarding the class of risk of the project. As we focus on banks' risk 
taking incentives, we make the parametric assumption on assets such that the bank net 
expected value is increasing with the class of risk of the investment. We indeed concentrate 
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3.1. Optimal asset's class of risk 
As a solution to (10), the bank will select the investment project which belongs to the last 
class of risk that satisfies their own target of default probability. Formally the bank retains the 
last asset's class of risk which satisfies: 
 
* Pr ( ) rB Kz k πα ⎡⎤ +≥ = ⎣⎦  
Substituting  ( ) z π  by its value and rearranging, we obtain equivalently (see appendix 1) 
  []
* () ( 1 )





Kk S p K




















 represents the critical threshold that the default rate must 
not exceed in order to satisfy the bank's internal target of default probability. As the default 
rate  ( ) i pz is distributed under the cumulative distribution function  () () i Fpz , we have (see 
appendix 2): 
  []


















iB p φρ φ α
φ
ρ
−− ⎛⎞ + ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ − ⎟ ⎜ ⎝⎠
 is the distribution of the default rate adjusted to the bank's 
own target of default probability. The optimal asset's class of risk 
*
i p  retained by the bank 









p Kk S p K
Sp
φρ φ α δ
φ
δλ ρ
−− ⎛⎞ + ⎟ ⎜ −+ + + ⎟ ⎜ = ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ++ − ⎟ ⎜ ⎝⎠
 (13) 
 
The distribution function of the default rate, adjusted to the bank's own target of default 
probability, is increasing with both the bank's target and the class of risk the asset belongs to. 









−− ⎛⎞ + ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ = ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ − ⎟ ⎜ ⎝⎠
, which leads to a 
simpler expression of the condition on optimality of asset's class of risk. 
 Alexandra Girod et Olivier Bruno 
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  ()
** ( )() () ( 1 ) ii r aS p S p K k K φδ λ δ ++ − = − + +  (14) 
 
Let's define  () () ( ) () () ii i fp a Sp Sp φδ λ =+ + − .  () i fp  can be seen as an expression of the 
expected loss conditional on the default rate adjusted to the bank's internal target of default 
probability. The shape of this conditional expected loss, which we call hereafter the bank-
adjusted expected loss, depends on the variation of spreads regarding the asset's class of risk. 
Proposition 1 gives the optimal asset choice of the bank whatever the risk sensitivity of 
regulatory requirements (Basel I or Basel II). 
 
PROPOSITION 1. 
  a. Assume that 






φδ λ ∂∂ + +
<⋅
∂∂ −








. The variation 
of the spreads rate regarding the class of risk the asset belongs to were such that the bank-











, there is an interior solution and the optimal class of risk retained by the 











, the class of risk retains by the bank would be the riskiest one available 
max p . 
 
  b. Assume that 






φδ λ ∂∂ + +
>⋅
∂∂ −










. The variation 
of spreads rate in regards with the class of risk of the asset were such that the bank-adjusted 
expected loss is decreasing with the class of risk of the asset. The class of risk of the asset 
retained by the bank would be the riskiest one  max p . This corner solution would be induced by 
the HRHR asset assumption ■ 
 
Proof of PROPOSITION 1. See appendix 3. 
Proposition 1 describes the asset optimal choice of the bank with no special assumption 
concerning the nature of the capital requirements as  r k  can be given by Basel I or Basel II 
regulatory requirements. However, it is possible to show that regulatory requirements impact 
the threshold the bank-adjusted expected loss should not exceeds and thus, the optimal class 
of risk retained at equilibrium by the bank. It means that bank's optimal choice will be 
impacted by a change in the regulatory environment. 
3.2. The regulatory requirements 
The first version of the bank capital regulation, the Basel I framework, displayed a risk 
sensitivity related to the legal category the loan belongs to, such as corporate, sovereign 
debtors etc., but an invariant risk weighting within a particular legal category, leading to a 
uniform capital to asset ratio for this category. We translate this invariant regulatory 
requirements on corporate loans under Basel I capital regulation with:  8% r k = . 
On the contrary, the sensitivity of the revised framework, the Basel II capital regulation, is 
related not solely to the legal category of the loan but also to its risk level, more precisely to 
the class of risk to whom the loan is assigned. The regulatory risk weight function and the 
parameters applied into the computation of regulatory requirements depend on the legal Bank Optimal Portfolio Risk Level Under Various Regulatory Requirements 
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category of the loan (Corporate, Small and Medium Enterprises, Sovereign debtor, etc...). 
Nevertheless, for a given category, a risk weight function determines the regulatory 
requirements which are increasing with the risk level of the asset. This risk sensitivity will be 











Moreover, for corporate loans, the regulatory weight function, constructed on the ASRF 
model, gets the reduced form: 
  () (( ) ) ri i r e g i k p EAD LGD p z p =×× −  (15) 
With the exposure at default (EAD) equals to 1 in our model; the loss given default (LGD), λ 
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 the default rate adjusted to the target of non-default 
probability fixed by the regulator.  
As a consequence of the different risk sensitivities of the regulation, the optimal class of risk 
retained by the bank will be different. 
In the case of Basel I,  (1 ) r Kk K δ −+ + is constant and the optimal class of risk retained by 
the bank is the one that fulfilled the following condition 
() ( ) () () ( 1 ) ii r aS p S p K k K φδ λ δ ++ − = − + +  (16) 
Note that  r k  should be substituted to  r k  in proposition 1 in order to obtain the optimal choice 
of the bank. 
In the case of Basel II,  () ( 1 ) ri Kk p K δ −+ +  is decreasing with the asset's class of risk and 
the optimal class of risk retained by the bank is the one that fulfilled the following condition 
() ( ) () () () ( 1 ) ii r i aS p S p K k p K φδ λ δ ++ − = − + +  (17) 
Note that  () ri kp should be substituted to  r k  in proposition 1 in order to obtain the optimal 
choice of the bank. 
Depending on the initial banks portfolio risk level, the implementation of the revised 
framework may modify the regulatory requirement the bank faces. By numerical simulation, 
we can determine the risk level of the asset which leads to the same regulatory requirements 
under both regulations and for  2.269 % s p =  we have  ( ) 0.08 rr s kk p == . 
Given that Basel II capital requirements are increasing with the class of risk of the asset, a bank 
whose portfolio displays a risk level higher than  s p  will face an increase in its regulatory 
requirements after the switch of regulation. Conversely, a bank's portfolio composed with asset 
belonging to a class of risk inferior to  s p  will benefit from a reduction in the regulatory 
requirements. It means that the change in the value of the capital requirements incites bank to 
change its behaviour and thus impact the optimal level of risk of its asset. Actually, we show that 
the impact of the regulatory requirements on the choice of asset's class of risk lies on the initial 
capital level the bank gets to comply with its own target of default probability. 
 
3.3. The impact of the regulatory risk sensitivity on the asset risk level choice 
We define  () s Kp  as the initial capital endowment that leads the bank to select the class of risk 
s p  under Basel I capital requirements that is:  
  () ( )() () () () ( 1 )
s ps s s r s aS p S p K p kK p φδ λ δ ++ − = − + +  
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In the same line, we determine  max () Kp  as the capital endowment allowing the bank to opt 
for the asset assigned to the riskiest class  max p . Under the Basel II capital regulation,  max () Kp  
must satisfy 
()
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1. If  () s KK p <  the bank will increase the level of risk of its equilibrium asset after a shift 
from Basel I to Basel II. 
2. If  max () ( ) s Kp K Kp <<  the bank will decrease the level of risk of its equilibrium asset 
after a shift from Basel I to Basel II. 
3. If  max () KK p >  the bank keeps unchanged its optimal asset class of risk which is already 
the maximum one  max p  ■ 
 
The proof of proposition 2 is the following. 
Case 1. Bank initial capital endowment is inferior to  () s Kp  and the optimal asset's class of 
risk retained under Basel I 
*
i p  is inferior to  s p . Given that the Basel II capital requirements 
are increasing with the class of risk of the asset, this leads that the implementation of the 
revised framework decreases the regulatory requirements the bank faces. What can be the 
reaction of a value maximizing bank which faces a freeing of capital? The class of risk 
*
is pp <  that was optimally selected under Basel I is thus no longer the equilibrium one as 
() ()
** * ( )() () ( 1 ) ii r i aS p S p K kp K φδ λ δ ++ − < − + + . Consequently, the bank 
reallocates its asset in order to comply with its objectives: maximising its value while 
respecting its internal target of risk. Under our assumption of HRHR, these objectives lead to 
a selection of a riskier asset 
**
j i pp >  under Basel II such that 
() ()
** * ( )() () ( 1 ) jj r j aS p S p K kp K φδ λ δ ++ − = − + + . Hence, this lightening in the 
regulatory charges induces the bank to choose for an asset assigned to a riskier class of risk in 
order to increase its value (cf. graph 1 for illustrative purpose). 
 
Case 2. The initial capital endowment is comprised between  () s Kp  and  () Max Kp . The Basel I 
optimal choice of asset's class of risk 
*
i p  is superior to  s p  inducing an increase in the 
regulatory charges after the switch in regulation. However, the level of capital endowment is 
not high enough to both absorb the increase in capital requirements and still comply with the 
internal target of default probability. In the same line of reasoning than before, this Bank Optimal Portfolio Risk Level Under Various Regulatory Requirements 
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strengthening of the regulatory constraint leads the bank to opt for a less risky asset in order 
to respect its own target of default probability (cf. graph 2). 
 
Case 3. Finally, if the capital endowment is superior to  () Max Kp , the Basel I optimal asset's 
class of risk retained by the bank 
*
i p  is riskier than  s p  (actually it is the maximum level of 
risk  max p , see proposition 1). Although this leads to an increase in the regulatory requirements 
after the implementation of Basel II, the level of capital of the bank is high enough to absorb 
this increase with respect to its own target of default probability. The bank thus keeps its 
portfolio unchanged and preserves its value. 
We can depict these mechanisms for specific values of the spread extracted from Resti and 
Sironi (2007). We use a riskless interest rate of 5% () 0.05 δ = , a LGD of 45 % as in Basel II 
() 0.45 λ =  and 
* 99.99% B α = .
8 As the classes of risk available for the bank are not 
continuous, its optimal choice will be the last one that satisfies its own target of default 
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8. Equivalent to a AAA rating. 
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Many studies concentrate their attention to cyclical effects of regulatory requirements, 
analysing the lending behaviour of banks along the business cycle. They conclude that capital 
requirements impact banks lending behaviour amplifying the cyclicality of the economy, 
phenomenon known as procyclicality. Moreover, the risk sensitivity of regulatory 
requirements accentuates the procyclicality: during economic downturns, risk estimations of 
borrowers are severer than under economic upturns. This induces higher capital requirements 
while economic conditions decline and leads banks to cut their credit supply, worsening thus 
the recession. The reverse happens during economic upturns, where regulatory requirements 
decrease while economic conditions improve, allowing thus banks to boost their loans supply 
and exacerbating the economic boom. 
Such analysis, detailed in the introduction, are generally done in the literature by studying the 
asset side of banks portfolio with segregation between loans and bonds, adding to the 
assumption of a positive amount of regulatory requirements assigned to loans and none for 
bonds; distinction we do not operate in our model. Assuming indeed an exposure at default 
equates to one allows us concentrating our analysis on the impact of risk sensitivity capital 
requirements on the choice of asset's risk level. The question we address is thus the following: 
what would be, along the business cycle, the impact of the regulatory risk sensitivity on the 
asset's risk level retained by banks? 
To study this point, we add the assumption that the borrower's default probability assessed by 
the bank depends on the relative position of the economy within the business cycle: during 
economic upturns, estimations of borrowers' default probabilities are more favourable than 
during economic downturns. We translate this relation between the business cycle c , and the 
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As we already stress, within a particular regulatory category, Basel II capital requirements are 
risk sensitive whereas Basel I regulatory charges are risk invariant. Consequently the 
cyclicality of the economy affects the Basel II regulatory requirements while leaving 
unchanged the Basel I regulatory requirements: 
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These variations in regulatory requirements impact the threshold the optimal asset's class of 
risk must not exceed (referee to equations (16) and (17)). Under Basel I, the threshold remains 
constant, equals to  (1 ) r Kk K δ −+ + whereas under Basel II, this constraint becomes 
positively related to the business cycle, softening as the economic conditions improve (c +), 
strengthening while they deteriorate (c −) and  
() () () ( 1 ) () ( 1 ) ri ri Kk p c K Kk p c K δδ −− + + ≤ −+ + +  
On the other side, credit spreads and default rates, i.e. default probabilities conditional on the 
realization of the systematic risk factor, also depend on the business cycle. As we make the 
HRHR asset assumption, credit spreads are negatively linked with the business cycle: while 
economic conditions improve, credit spreads decrease, reflecting an easier access to liquidity 
and higher expectations on investment returns; reverse happening while economic conditions 
deteriorate. This result is formally express by the following equation: 























In the same line of thinking, the default rate of a project is also negatively related to the 
business cycle, decreasing as the economic conditions improve. Reminding that the default 
























9 we have 
 












Then recalling that under Basel I, the optimal asset's class of risk is such that: 
  () () () (( ) ) ( ) ( ) ( 1) ii i r apc Spc Sp K k K φδ λ δ ++ − = − + +  
We can synthesize the effects of the economic cycle on the choice of optimal asset's class of 
risk by the bank. In order for the initial equilibrium choice of the bank under Basel I to be 
invariant with the cycle, we must have following condition 
                                                 
9. As φ  denotes the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random variable, it is by definition 




() () () () () ()
































() () () () () ()






























                    (22) 
Equation (22) means that, in order for the bank to keep unchanged its initial choice of asset, 
the variation in the expected return in case of investment failure, 
() () () () () ()














, must be overbalanced by the 
variation in the expected return in case of project success 
() () () () () ()
** * () ()













When economic conditions improve, both of them are negative. Consequently the decrease in 
the expected return in case of success, due to a decline in credit spreads, should be of lesser 
magnitude than the drop of the expected return in case of failure, for the initial asset's class of 
risk to remain optimal for the bank. 
Conversely, both elements of (22) are positive when economic conditions worsen. The rise in 
expected returns in case of success, due to an increase in credit spreads, must compensate the 
higher expected returns in case of investment failure, for the asset's class of risk to remain 
optimal for bank.  
 
With the same line of thinking, the optimal asset's class of risk is reached in Basel II when: 
  () () () () ( ( ) ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) (1 ) ii i r i apc Spc Spc K k pc K φδ λ δ ++ − = − + +  
Consequently, the initial equilibrium choice of the bank under Basel II is invariant with the 
cycle if, 
() () () () () ()
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Note that condition (23) is similar to the one obtain under Basel I capital regulation, except 
the added of the term  () ()












. This term adjusts the expected 
return in case of success with a "regulatory bonus" when the business cycle improve and / or 
when the asset's class of risk retained is riskless, and conversely, with a "regulatory penalty" 
when a risky asset is selected by the bank and / or when the economic conditions deteriorate. 
Actually, during economic downturns, credit spreads, default rates and regulatory 
requirements increase. As a consequence, in order for the initial class of risk to remain 
optimal for the bank, the trade off depicted by (23) requires that the increase in credit spreads, 
which raises the expected returns in case of success, must overbalances both the raise in the 
expected returns in case of project failure and the "regulatory penalty". 
On the contrary, when economic conditions improve, spreads rate, default rate and regulatory 
capital charges decrease. In order for the initial class of risk to remain optimal for the bank, 
the fall in expected returns in case of investment success, partially or fully compensated by 
the "regulatory bonus" must not be higher than the decline in expected returns in case of 
project failure. Variations in Basel II regulatory requirements due to economic cycle interact 
with the trade off initially depicted under Basel I, strengthening it when economic conditions 
deteriorate, softening it while business circumstances improve. Proposition 3 summarizes the 
cyclical impact of risk sensitivity requirements on the optimal asset class of risk, for a 
constant capital endowment: 
 
PROPOSITION 3. 
Assume a change in the business cycle () c ∂  and a continuum of classes of risk,  ]] max 0; i pp ∈  
with  max 1 p < . 
1. If 
() () () () () ()
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The bank will opt for a riskier asset 
**
j i pp >  with 
*
j p  such that 
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The bank will opt for a less risky asset 
**
ki pp <  with 
*
k p  such that Bank Optimal Portfolio Risk Level Under Various Regulatory Requirements 
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Proposition 3 is easily understandable as it answers to the following question: what's happens 
when equilibrium condition (23) is no longer fulfilled? 
Actually, the bank must be incited to change its behaviour and choose a riskier or lower risk 
level as optimal. Two situations are possible. In the case of an economic expansion, the 
lightening in regulatory capital charges creates a "regulatory bonus" for the bank. The 
softening of regulatory requirements impacts all classes of risk. Furthermore, the freeing of 
regulatory capital for the bank onto the particular class of risk initially retained, associated 
with the lightening of regulatory requirements for all classes of risk, might incite the bank to 
opt for a new class of risk, exploiting the gain of regulatory capital to allocate across a riskier 
class of asset to increase its value (case 1 of proposition 3). Within the same line of thinking, 
additional regulatory requirements due to worsen economic conditions impact all asset classes 
of risk. This "regulatory penalty" would be of such amount that it overbalances the increase in 
expected returns and leads the bank to select for a new class of risk, reducing the risk level 
retained to comply with its own target of default probability (case 2 of proposition 3). 
However, this process of asset reallocation is always possible in our setting only because we 
assume that the bank can choose its optimal level of risk in a continuous range of assets 
]] max 0; i pp ∈ . Actually, in a more realistic setting, the granularity of the risk bucket available 
to the bank is not infinite, and borrowers sharing different risk profile are to be clustered into 
the same risk bucket. The risk bucket PD
10 represents the regulatory input used to compute 
capital requirements, and leads to thresholds effects. In that case, for instance, the switch 
towards a riskier asset implies a discontinuous jump from a risk bucket to a riskier one. 
Depending on the granularity of the bank's risk bucket, this jump towards a riskier bucket may 
raise regulatory requirements of such an amount that bank cannot comply with the constraint 
for that risk level. In this case, where the next risk bucket leads to an infringement of the 
constraint, the bank keeps its current asset even if the risk level is sub-optimal (i.e. not 
binding with the constraint). The same reasoning applies in case of economic recession. If the 
regulatory "penalty", related to the current risk bucket the asset belongs to, is of such an 
amount that this risk level is no more optimal, there is an incentive for the bank to move 
towards a lower risk bucket. However, because of risk bucket granularity, the bank must be 
obliged to opt for the first risk bucket that complies with the constraint even if this leads to a 
selection of a risk level that is suboptimal (i.e. not binding with the constraint). 
The traditional literature concludes to the pro-cyclical impact of capital requirements in terms of 
volume of lending, as on the exacerbation of this phenomenon by the risk sensitivity embodied 
into the revised regulatory ratio. Our analysis stresses the pro-cyclical impact in terms of risk level 
induced by the risk sensitivity of the revised ratio. In addition to the trade off between the 
variations in expected returns in case of failure or success of the project existing under Basel I, is 
added either a "regulatory bonus" which can be exploited by the bank or a "regulatory penalty" 
that restricts the bank. As economic conditions improve, the gain in regulatory capital can be used 
by the bank to increase its value, retaining a riskier class of asset and exacerbating the economic 
boom. If such a scenario happens, the rise into the risk level of bank portfolio leads to a 
weakening of the bank which is similar to an increase in financial fragility. In case of deterioration 
                                                 
10. Defined as the average or the mean of borrowers' PD; we discuss latter whether the bank internal rating 
system is either PIT or TTC impacts our result.  Alexandra Girod et Olivier Bruno 
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in business conditions, the additional regulatory charges can constrain the bank to reduce its risk 
level, amplifying the credit crunch and the recession. This lowering into the risk level of the bank 
portfolio represents a "fly to quality" phenomenon. 
5. Discussion 
The analysis conducted in this model investigates the impact the risk sensitive regulatory 
capital to asset ratio may have on banks' risk taking behaviours. Two aspects are analysed: we 
first concentrate on the potential effects induced by the implementation of a risk sensitive 
ratio while the flat rate requirements prevailed. We then study the cyclical impact that could 
affect bank risk taking behaviour according to the risk sensitivity of the regulatory 
requirements. To the initial trade-off between marginal variations in expected returns in case 
of investment failure or success, which may drive the risk taking behaviour of the bank along 
the business cycle, the risk sensitivity of the regulatory requirements adds either a "regulatory 
bonus" or a "regulatory penalty". Depending on the magnitude of the cyclical variations into 
regulatory requirements, the "bonus" may be exploited by the bank to increase its value 
toward the selection of a riskier asset when economic conditions improve, whereas when 
recession occurs, the "penalty" may restrict the bank to opt for a less risky asset. Whether the 
optimal asset risk level swings from a class of risk to another through the cycle, the financial 
fragility may increase during economic upturns. 
The sensitivity of regulatory parameters, i.e. the default probability related to borrowers' class 
of risk for foundation IRB approach, added to the exposure at default (EAD) and the loss 
given default (LGD) for advanced IRB approach, depends on banks internal system.  Mainly 
two rating systems exist: PIT and TTC, with the former being more sensitive to cyclical 
variations than the latter. Higher sensitivity seems favour the emergence of a new class of risk 
as optimal: higher sensitivity of such regulatory parameters induced more sensitive 
estimations to business cycle fluctuations that encourage the swing among asset's classes of 
risk. Banks using a PIT rating system may be more inclined to adjust the risk level of their 
loans portfolio along the business cycle than TTC rating system operating banks, converging 
to the established result of higher procyclicality under PIT approach, but in terms of asset risk 
level instead of loans volume.  
The shareholders' dominated ownership structure and the distribution of asset earnings of our 
setting exacerbate risk taking incentives. However the analysis made by Jeitschko and Dong 
Jeung (2005) gives us two interesting results.  
First, they conclude that a risk sensitive regulation leads to the convergence into the 
respective objective of the main bank liability owners. Actually shareholders seek to 
maximize the value of their capital, whereas the regulator, on behalf of depositors, aims to 
avoid bankruptcy. The risk sensitive capital regulation, involving higher requirements for 
higher risk level, brings closer shareholders and regulator respective objectives. An increase 
in capital requirements curbs shareholders risk appetite. However, increased capital 
requirements minimize the bank probability of failure, involving for some regulatory 
forbearance. Consequently, under the risk sensitive regulation, the optimal risk level chosen 
by shareholders and regulator might be closer: compare to the flat rate ratio, shareholders opt 
for a lower risk level whereas regulator might concede an increase in its optimal risk level.  
Second, they highlight that earnings distribution displaying a constant or a decreasing mean of 
returns for an increasing volatility as the risk level (α) of the asset growths, i.e. the traditional 
mean ordering distribution with  '( ) 0 ; '( ) 0 μα σα ≤≥ , leads the shareholders to favour those 
higher returns / lower risk assets under a risk sensitive regulation. Those risk profiles imply 
higher requirements for an unchanged or a decreasing mean of returns when the risk level 
increases. Under a risk sensitive regulation, shareholders optimal risk level for such earning Bank Optimal Portfolio Risk Level Under Various Regulatory Requirements 
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distribution might incur a significant drop compare to risk insensitive capital ratio. To allow 
for the emergence a risk taking behaviour, the HRHR asset risk profiles must be retained.  
Although our setting with shareholders-owners banks and HRHR asset risk profile 
exacerbates risk taking behaviour, the convergence of the optimal risk level selected by each 
owner of bank liability under risk sensitive requirements supports the view that the ownership 
structure of bank capital may be less decisive than under a flat rate ratio. 
Our result concerning the cyclical impacts of risk sensitive regulatory requirements derives 
from a comparative static analysis under a constant capital endowment. This constant capital 
assumption contrasts with other settings that assume a free adjustable leverage for the bank. 
Moreover our setting gives an interesting sight with regard to the Basel III novelties: the 
leverage ratio and the capital buffer conservative and countercyclical policies.
11   
The leverage ratio acts as a backstop ratio the bank capital shall not fall below (fixed at 3%). 
As it aims to give a complementary measure of the risk of the bank, the Basel Committee 
defines it as a risk insensitive measure: the capital (numerator) as exposure (denominator) are 
denominated in amount without being related to the risk weighted asset computed under the 
first pillar. Our setting examines how risk sensitive requirements impact along the business 
cycle the risk taking behaviour of a bank at constant capital endowment: the leverage ratio is 
constant in our setting and above the leverage ratio prescribed by the banking regulation.  
Instituting such a leverage ratio aims to prevent from excessive leverage and tries to deal with 
systemic risk: it aims that capital would not fall below a minimum to maintain a shock 
absorbing capability from the bank. However it does not interact with the cyclical impacts 
induced by the risk sensitive requirements as presented by our analysis. The cyclical 
variations into regulatory requirements affect bank's risk taking behaviour, fostering its risk 
appetite as regulatory requirements soften, restricting it as regulatory requirements strengthen, 
without modifying the leverage ratio in our setting (constant capital level and exposure set at 
one by assumption). The leverage ratio seems to be a complementary measure of the risk of 
the bank in a risk-wide managing perspective but does not prevent from a risk taking 
behaviour induced by the business cycle variations into the regulatory requirements.  
The conservative and the countercyclical buffers are both defined as a 2.5% additional 
requirement of the risk weighted asset. Both buffers pursue the objective that banks operate 
with capital level well above the minimum required by the first pillar such that the bank can 
absorb financial shocks. More precisely both policies require the bank to build up capital 
buffer during economic upturns that can be draw down as losses occur during business 
downturns. The conservative buffer applies at each expansion period whereas the 
countercyclical buffer occurs only under the supervisory decision, when credit growth is 
perceived as excessive by the supervisory authorities. They define a corridor of additional 
capital requirements the bank must comply with, otherwise a penalty, consisting in restricting 
the earning to be distributed as dividend, applies. They complete the first pillar and the 
leverage ratio in their objective of avoiding a spill over of financial shocks to the real 
economy by maintaining a level of capital high enough to absorb shock.   
Our analysis stresses the level of capital that excesses regulatory requirements plays a crucial role 
to allow the bank exploiting the regulatory "bonus" by means of a risk taking behaviour that 
increases its value as business conditions improve. Instituting a conservative buffer the bank must 
build up and maintain as good business conditions prevail, counteracts the risk taking opportunity 
offered by the regulatory "bonus". Only very highly capitalized banks could exploit the regulatory 
"bonus" under a conservative buffer policy. Less well capitalized banks that face this additional 
requirement may transfer the "bonus" obtained from an alleviate in the regulatory ratio to the 
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conservative buffer requirement, otherwise they would have to raise capital to increase their 
optimal asset risk level and comply with these two requirements.    
Although our setting cannot precisely examine what the countercyclical buffer implies on our 
result, we think that it reinforces the risk restrictive impact of the conservative buffer. Whether a 
very highly capitalized bank could exploit the regulatory "bonus" and still complies with both 
regulatory ratio and conservative buffer requirements, the occurrence of this further countercyclical 
buffer may restrict the bank risk taking behaviour, inducing the bank to raise capital to comply 
with those three requirements that could equals 13% of the risk weighted asset.
12  
The regulatory "penalty" occurring as business conditions worsen leads the bank to lower its 
optimal risk level in our setting. The conservative and the countercyclical buffers prevail only 
during expansion phase, the bank being no longer required to maintain these additional 
requirements during economic downturns. Moreover the conservative and the countercyclical 
buffers aim to be drawn down as bank incurs losses. These additional regulatory capital 
requirements, inherited from the expansion period, may help the bank to comply with the first 
pillar as its own target of default without modifying its asset choice. Those buffers may help 
avoiding or diminishing the "fly to quality" phenomenon that could occurs under the recession.   
The Committee defines the buffers to a risk-wide management perspective, aiming that the 
capital level of individual banks would be high enough to prevent from a widening of shocks 
to the financial as the real sectors. Therefore the design of these policies, applying as 
economic conditions get better, helps counteracting the risk taking opportunities induced by 
the risk sensitive requirements that vary with the business cycle. Only very highly capitalized 
bank could insulate from the restrictive impacts of the buffer policies and exploit the 
regulatory "bonus", if we reason under a constant capital level.      
Admittedly, we exogenously set the capital endowment in our framework and we assume it to 
be constant. For a short horizon of analysis as for comparative statics, these assumptions seem 
reasonable. Nevertheless, to inquire the risk taking behaviour along the cycle, it would be 
interesting to investigate the optimal leverage choice of the bank. As the optimal leverage 
impacts the optimal risk level of loans portfolio, and reciprocally, the optimal risk level of 
loans portfolio influences the optimal leverage of bank liability, the dynamic analysis of risk 
taking behaviour along the business cycle would ideally require a framework that 
endogenously determines both the optimal leverage ratio as the portfolio risk level. The bank 
internal target of default probability might also interact with those elements as it depends on 
both the optimal portfolio risk level and the capital leverage. 
The analysis conducted by Milne and Whalley (2001) represents a first spet toward this 
challenge, as they endogenously determine the capital level but they made comparative statics 
and do not retain an internal target of default probability. Moreover, they assume an asset side 
of bank portfolio that is fixed and not explicitly modelled. Their result stresses the role the 
franchise value may play on risk taking behaviour, mitigating the risk taking incentives. 
However the franchise value, which reflects asset future earnings, directly depends on the risk 
level of asset selected by the bank in the current period. Although the non linear relation 
between franchise value and bank desired level of capital they establish in their setting seems 
taking into consideration that higher returns bring higher franchise value and provides an 
earning protection against regulatory infringements, they do not integrate this intuition in their 
risk taking behaviour comparative statics. The intuition that the existence of a franchise value 
may induce the bank to act prudently to preserve it, as Milne and Whalley (2001) highlight, 
competes with the idea that an increase in the risk level today fosters future asset earnings and 
increases bank franchise value, as Blum (1998) and Hellman and al (2000) stress.  
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The HRHR risk profile of our framework implies, in the scenario of a rise in asset risk level, an 
increase in both the current and the next period bank value with still a compliance on regulatory 
requirements and bank own target of default probability. The latter effect of franchise value 
described by Blum (1999) and Hellman and al (2000) seems prevail on the former in our setting. 
Actually all depends on the cyclical pattern the bank expects for the next period economic 
conditions, as the potential adjustment on leverage ratio the bank can do. 
The dynamic analysis conducted by Estrella (2004) brings some answers to this issue. His 
study focuses on the cyclical effects risk sensitive capital requirements, like a value-at-risk 
capital ratio, may have on the optimal capital target selected along the business cycle by a 
bank that optimizes over costs associated with failure, holding capital, and flows of external 
capital. Although he does not examine the asset risk level optimally selected, he incorporates 
into his infinite-horizon optimization program an optimal probability of failure that is 
endogenously determined. 
He starts from the assumption that the business cycle is a predictable pattern that unfolds over 
time which should be incorporated into the decision of capital target by a forward looking 
bank. Without detailing his study, we present the intuition that conducts the bank decision 
program and his main results. As costs prevail on both directions into capital level adjustment 
(when bank raises or sheds capital), it appears optimal for the bank to lose capital at the peak 
of the recession, for absorbing borrowers default, instead of increasing capital. In the same 
thinking, it reveals optimal for the bank to build up capital while the expansion prevails. The 
lag between the risk sensitivity of regulatory requirements, which are in adequacy with the 
cyclical pattern of asset returns, and bank's capital level target stands on the adjustment costs 
related to external capital flows. 
Estrella (2004) stresses the divergence between the regulatory requirements level and bank 
optimal target: while economic conditions deteriorate and recession occurs, risk sensitive 
requirements increase whereas optimal bank capital level decreases, absorbing borrowers 
default. At the peak of economic downturn, which announces the reversal into economic 
cyclicality toward the expansion phase, although capital requirements remain at important 
level, they begin to decrease to reflect the improvement of the business environment. Bank 
capital target however continues to decrease, the cost minimizing objective pushes the bank to 
absorb losses on capital rather raise capital since it is costly. The credit crunch may occur 
during this second sequence of the economic downturns as risk capital requirements may 
exceed bank optimal target level, encouraging a shift toward low risk asset that soften 
regulatory requirements. 
When economic expansion arises, regulatory requirements decrease to reach their lowest level at 
the peak of the economic upturn. During the emergence of the good period, the bank optimal 
capital target increases: the adjustment costs make desirable to raise new capital while business 
conditions improve, as asset earnings increase and compensate the adjustment cost of capital 
level. At the highest level of expansion phase, the cyclical pattern predicts a reversal into 
economic environment toward a recession period, which leads the risk sensitive requirements to 
increase, but it remains optimal for the bank to build up capital during this ending of economic 
upturn. As a consequence the optimal capital target is well above the regulatory requirements at 
the peak of the expansion. Estrella (2004) highlights the moral hazard problem that may be 
exacerbated when expansion prevails under risk sensitive capital requirements. 
Our setting assumes a constant capital endowment higher than regulatory requirements. Under 
such a restrictive assumption, we depict how the risk sensitive ratio may induce risk taking 
behaviour: as economic upturn occurs and frees regulatory capital, the bank can exploit the 
"regulatory bonus" to increase its value toward the selection of a riskier asset. The results of 
Estrella (2004) reinforce the idea that moral hazard problem may exists under risk sensitive 
requirements for a bank that selects its optimal level of capital along the business cycle. Alexandra Girod et Olivier Bruno 
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Adjustment costs create a lag between the optimal capital level target and risk sensitive 
requirements. This involves diverging cyclical evolutions of the bank capital target and risk 
sensitive requirements: capital target increases as expansion unfolds and decreases while 
recession prevails, i.e. from the beginning to the end of the expansion / recession phase, whereas 
risk sensitive requirements decrease as economic conditions gets better and increase as business 
condition worsen; i.e. from an expansion (recession) peak to a recession (expansion) peak. These 
diverging cyclical behaviours create a gap between capital level and requirements that is highest 
at the peak of expansion phase, when risk assessment parameters are lowest. Assuming the bank 
endogenously determines its leverage along the business cycle seems in favour of our intuition, 
risk taking behaviour may occur when expansion prevails. As the bank optimal leverage is well 
above regulatory requirements at the peak of expansion phase, the bank can decide to exploit its 
excess of capital to foster its value toward the selection of a riskier asset. The resulting weakening 
of bank safety may accentuate the loss the bank faces when recession happens, particularly in a 
dynamic setting where it is optimal for the bank to absorb losses on capital instead of raising it. 
Our intuition that the "regulatory penalty" brought by risk sensitive requirements further restricts 
bank risk behaviour and pushes it to opt for an even lower asset's risk level, leads to a "fly to 
quality" phenomenon that exacerbates the credit crunch.  
The analysis of Estrella (2004) reinforces the crucial role of the buffer policies. However 
these buffers requirements that apply while expansion prevails can be integrated into the 
bank's decision program as the level of requirements the bank must comply with in expansion. 
They do not alter the cyclical behaviour of the bank's optimal leverage target depicted into the 
analysis conducted by Estrella: it is optimal for the bank to raise capital as expansion prevails, 
and to absorb losses on capital when recession occurs. Implementing a conservative as a 
countercyclical buffer could narrow the gap that may occurs at the expansion peak between 
the risk sensitive requirements, including the buffers, and the optimal bank leverage target, 
and may help to prevent from the occurrence of a credit crunch when recession prevails. But 
the bank could also integrate them into its program and raise an even higher target of capital 
during expansion.  
It seems that under a dynamic setting within the bank can adjust its optimal leverage target along 
the business cycle, the buffer policies help to soften the spill-over of the credit cycle to real sector. 
But it does not really counteract the risk taking opportunity or restriction that emerges from the 
cyclical variations into risk sensitive requirements as we depict into our formalization. All 
depends on the conditions and the costs associated to a raise of capital for the bank.  
6. Conclusion 
The risk sensitivity of the revised framework brings closer the respective objective of each 
owner of the bank liability and consequently seems prevent from regulatory trades-off and 
risk taking incentives embodied into a flat rate capital to asset ratio for the mean-variance 
ordering asset risk profiles. However the HRHR assets may still offer risk tanking incentives 
under a risk sensitive regulatory framework.  
Actually, under a risk sensitive regulation, regulatory requirements vary with the business 
cycle, strengthening while economic conditions worsen, softening as the economy gets better. 
The freeing of regulatory capital during upturns, the "regulatory bonus", can be exploited by 
the bank to increase its value toward the financing of a riskier asset that enhances the value of 
bank equities. With the same line of thinking, the "regulatory penalty" that grows as business 
conditions worsen can restrict the bank risk taking behaviour, pushing it to opt for a lower 
risk level of asset during recessions. The analysis stresses the procyclicality in terms of asset 
risk level induced by the risk sensitive regulation, and the resulting bank weakening: potential 
increase in financial fragility as the expansion prevails. Bank Optimal Portfolio Risk Level Under Various Regulatory Requirements 
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Although our model embodies limits, the results cannot be excluded under less restrictive 
assumptions on the bank ownership structure as in a dynamic setting where the bank 
endogenously determines its optimal leverage ratio. Moreover the novelties of Basel III do not 
seem to counteract the risk taking opportunity offered by the "regulatory bonus". As in 
Estrella (2004), our results highlight the crucial role played by the second pillar: the 
Supervisory Review Process, which encompasses risks that are not taken into the computation 
of the first pillar (regulatory capital to asset ratio) as some aspects of the bank's risk 
governance and management structure as a whole, to assess the relevant requirements that can 
be enforced to the bank. The Four Principles, where the second and the third are reminded 
below,
13 appear essential to insure a safety banking system: 
 
Principle 2: Supervisors should review and evaluate banks’ internal capital adequacy 
assessments and strategies, as well as their ability to monitor and ensure their compliance 
with regulatory capital ratios. Supervisors should take appropriate supervisory action if they 
are not satisfied with the result of this process. 
Principle 3: Supervisors should expect banks to operate above the minimum regulatory 
capital ratios and should have the ability to require banks to hold capital in excess of the 
minimum. 
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Appendix 3. Proof of proposition 1. 
 
Recall that the optimal asset class of risk  ]] max 0; i pp ∈  chosen at equilibrium by the bank 
must satisfy the following equation 
  ()
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, φ  being a 
cumulative distribution function of a standard normal variable, strictly positively and 
increasing with risk by construction. 
 
According to the HRHR asset assumption, which implies low spreads level for low risk asset, 
we assume that  
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Note also that ρ is computed as in Basel II and it is decreasing with the asset probability of 
default with  [ ] 0.12;0.24 ρ ∈ . 
 
Let's begin by studying the limits of the two parts of equation (14) for  ]] max 0; i pp ∈ . 
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The limit of  (1 ) r Kk K δ −+ + depends on the regulatory capital requirements. 
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means that the left part of equation is always constant and positive under risk insensitive 
capital requirements. 
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As a consequence, whatever the risk sensitivity of regulatory requirements,  () i fp  starts below 
the left part of equation (14) when the asset belongs to the riskless level class. 
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Like before, the limit of  (1 ) r Kk K δ −+ + depends on the regulatory capital requirement. Alexandra Girod et Olivier Bruno 
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, with  rr kk =  in the case 
of Basel I and  max () rr kk p =  in Basel II. 
 
  Finally, the nature of the optimal equilibrium depends on the sensitivity of the spread 
to the risk of the asset. 
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, we have  () (1 ), ir i fp K k K p δ <−+ + ∀ . As the left part of 
equation is always higher than the right part, the class of risk retains by the bank would be the 
riskiest one available  max p . 
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() i fp  is continuously decreasing on  ]] max 0; i pp ∈  and  () 0( 1 ) r fK k K δ <−+ +, the left 
part of equation is always higher than the right part, the class of risk retains by the bank 
would be the riskiest one available  max p . 
 
The proof of proposition 1 is completed ■ 
 
 